CONDOMINIUM REGULATION: BEYOND DISCLOSURE
Inspired by President Kennedy's call "to provide decent
housing for all of our people,"' Congress amended the National
Housing Act in 1961 to allow for guaranteed mortgage insurance for the relatively untested condominium form of ownership in real property. 2 It did so with the express purpose of
"provid[ing] an additional means of increasing the supply of
privately owned dwelling units,"' 3 thus responding to the increas-

ingly serious housing problems of the nation's middle- and
lower-income citizens. 4 In response to this federal imprimatur,
most of the states subsequently approved enabling legislation
providing the legal framework necessary to the development of
these new and presumably low-cost projects. 5 Unfortunately,
many of the state statutes were patterned on the FHA model
established on the federal level 6 and were pushed through to
legislative enactment with little reflection or independent
analysis of the problems that were likely to occur. As a result, the
enabling acts are often unclear in many important areas.7 Since
condominiums were virtually unknown to the American legal
community before the 1960's, many of the problems inherent in
this new interest in real property were not even addressed by
these statutes. Consequently, many developers have succeeded in
manipulating and abusing the spirit, if not the letter, of the laws
to the detriment of individual purchasers. 8

I "Message

from the President of the United States," in Hearings on Amendments

to the Federal HousingLaws Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,

87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961).
2 In relevant part, the present text reads:
The Secretary is authorized, in his discretion and under such terms and
conditions as he may prescribe . . . to insure any mortgage covering a onefamily unit in a multifamily project and an undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities which serve the project ....
12 U.S.C. § 1715y(c) (1970).
3Id. § 1715y(a).
4 See S. REP. No. 281, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1961).
5See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.01-.32 (Supp. 1974), as amended, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 711.01-.72, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, §§ 1-19 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service
No. 2, 1974); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-d to ii (McKinney 1968), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 68, §§ 700.101-.805 (1971); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Supp. 1974).
6 U.S. Federal Housing Admin., Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Model
Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership (Form 3285, 1962).
7 See, e.g., notes 151-54 infra & accompanying text.
8

See notes 21-33 infra & accompanying text.
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As a result of such developer abuses, demands for renewed
legislative intervention have frequently arisen from an aggrieved
consumer public. Although this public outcry has increased substantially in recent years, it has never been particularly well focused or articulated. 9 Despite this lack of concentrated public
pressure for reform, the great numbers of complaints have had
their impact. Regrettably, this confused clamor for industry
supervision has been mirrored in the legislative and administrative regulatory responses. The result: a peculiar melange of
haphazard, unrelated regulation which has, until recently, failed
to offer substantial protection against the special problems of
condominium development and ownership.1 0
This Comment will examine the numerous existing layers of
public regulation as well as the recently proposed National Condominium Acts. Do any of the existing or proposed forms of
regulation effectively speak to the special problems and abuses
inherent in condominium ownership and development? Are
these systems of control proper and meaningful expansions of
the regulatory schemes? If not, what is an effective regulatory
alternative?
I.

THE PRESENT PATTERN: BACKGROUND

The condominium form of ownership developed in response to a highly concentrated and growing urban population
within some of the European capitals." The concept of horizontal ownership has evolved to its present status, however, primarily in American land use patterns.
Common to all condominium forms and central to all modern enabling statutes is "the allowance and protection for exclusive ownership of airspace, with essential concomitants of common ownership.' u Even in the absence of specific condominium
9 It was recently announced that a lobby group was being formed in Washington
to attempt to focus attention on the consumer problems of condominium development and sale. See [2 Current] BNA Hous. & DEv. REP. 169 (July 15, 1974). This group,
which calls itself the National Association of Condominium Owners, might have an
enormous impact if it can succeed in giving direction to the now amorphous special
interests. For a similar example of organized consumer interests on the state level,
see N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1974, § 8, at 1, col. 2.
'0In introducing S. 4047 on Sept. 26, 1974, Senator Proxmire recognized the
risk of poorly focused, layered regulation:
If [regulation] is done in a piecemeal and patchwork fashion, then we will end
up with a maze of differing and conflicting local standards which will cause
more confusion and invite futher abuses.
120 CONG. REc. 17,548 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1974).
11 D. CLUR-MAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 2-3 (1970).
12Id. 3.
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enabling legislation, the common law provided the basic
framework for individual ownership of apartment units. One
could construct a fee interest in air space and also convey an
undivided percentage interest as tenant-in-common in the structural parts and other facilities. 13 However, the common law was
unable to resolve two specific problems. Because a tenant-incommon could always require a partition of the jointly held
property, 14 any one tenant-in-common could, at his whim, bring
the tenancy to an abrupt end and destroy the underlying legal
structure. In addition, the common law was powerless to enforce
any but the most minimal affirmative covenants providing for
the maintenance
and improvement of the commonly held
5
elements.'
Even assuming that these problems could be solved through
a system of mutual covenants and restrictions which would be
understood as running with the land and thereby enforceable,
the real difficulty facing the common law was to develop a
mechanism which would provide for the contingency of partial
or total destruction of the building by fire or other natural disaster. Although there were, perhaps, existing means of drafting a
scheme of covenants answering these problems as well, the extremely fragile construction of a common law condominium resulted in negative responses from real estate developers and
lenders who were doubtful about the acceptability6 and continued
viability of this unusual form of fee ownership.'
Consequently, before any financing would be committed
towards condominium development, builders, lenders, and title
companies required specific legislative approval which would assure the safety of their investments. This approval came in 1961
with the enactment of section 234 of the
National Housing Act
7
and the subsequent state enabling acts.'
Developers have poured money into condominiums in the
last decade, but not in the anticipated manner. Instead of developing low-cost urban projects designed as primary residences
for those who could not afford traditional forms of residency
ownership, the surge of condominium development has been in
the high-income market: as resorts (often combined with a rental
pool arrangement for the periods not owner occupied), as second homes, and as primary residences in prestige locations.

" See

Krasnowiecki, Townhouse Condominiums Compared to Conventional Subdivision

with Home Association, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 323, 324 (1973).
144A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

609 (1971).

15Id. 604.

'6See J.

KRASNOWIECKI, OWNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAND 478 (1965).
'7 See notes 1-5 supra & accompanying text.
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Perhaps this should not have been surprising in view of the tax
incentives behind condominium ownership, which are of
greatest advantage to high-bracket taxpayers. Perhaps developers and their creditors were reluctant to try marketing this new
form of housing in any but the lowest risk markets. After a
decade of financially successful marketing in the high-income
area, condominiums today are widely predicted to become the
single most widely developed form of fee ownership in densely
populated urban areas. 18 Thus, a gradual return to the original
purpose of the enabling legislation may be approaching, with
condominium developments aimed at satisfying the need for
middle- and low-income primary residential housing. In light of
this eventual transformation in the market, a fresh look at the
experience under the established regulatory schemes is appropriate.
II. DEVELOPER ABUSES UNDER CURRENT REGULATION
The condominium developer can expose the purchaser to
two general classes of risks: misleading or fraudulent
advertising, 19 and the more sophisticated arrangements that, although not misrepresentations, may still ensure exorbitant returns to the developer at the expense of the purchaser. Generally speaking, both federal and state regulation has been aimed

"8See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 2, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 5 ("People who once rented
apartments or lived in single-family detached homes are moving into condominiums
at such a rapid rate that Federal officials expect half the population to live in them
within 20 years."); id. Sept. 23, 1973, § 8, dt 1, col. 5 (one expert "predicts that in I0
years the condominium will be the prevailing form of home ownership throughout the
United States.").
19 A favorite deceptive sales device, for example, is for the developer grossly to
underestimate monthly maintenance and recreation charges. He can put-his own money
in at first (so that the charges per owner appear lower than they will after the developer
has departed), fail to include items in the initial charges that will have to be included
later, or simply neglect to explain that the monthly charges will (legitimately) increase.
Cf. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1974, § I, at 1, col. 5-6; id. Feb. 14, 1971, § 8, at 6, col. 6-7.
The remarks made by Senator Proxmire when he and Senator Brooke introduced S. 4047 are also informative:
Open the real estate pages of any metropolitan area newspaper and you will
be bombarded with advertisements that promise your dreams will come true
when you buy your own condominium. Prospective buyers are told that they
will have all the advantages of homeownership, without the headaches of
maintenance and repair. They are lured with visions of swimming pools and
tennis courts-country club living at apartment prices.
But too often bright promises fade in the face of sad realities, and the
condominium owner finds himself faced with unanticipated problems and
unexpected expenses.
The monthly condominium fee charged for maintaining common areas
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at the first risk, requiring "full disclosure" of all terms prior to
sale. 20 But it is the second class of risks, those that may be disclosed but whose significance is only recognized by the sophisticated analyst, that have resulted in more serious consequences to
the condominium purchaser. For those subject to such risks, current federal and state regulation offers little in the way of protection or remedy.
Five examples of this second class of risk will be briefly
presented for purposes of illustration. They are the use of deposits, sweetheart leases, management contracts, extended control, and liability for shares of unsold unit expenses. Each of
these practices may be technically lawful under the "full disclosure" regulation now applied by the federal and most state governments. So long as the terms of sale permitting such abuses
are disclosed, the purchaser has little recourse against the unscrupulous developer for the abuses.
Many developers must secure a minimum number of preconstruction subscriptions before a lender will commit itself to
financing the project.2 1 This external pressure may lead to hasty
sales programs which describe, through colorful and enticing
literature, the future appearance of what, at that point, is most
likely a totally unimproved or only partially excavated parcel of
land. Deposits are collected from the subscribed purchasers.
Most of the state statutes make no provision for the use or ultimate disposition of the deposit receipts, which are, at this early
stage, high risk money. 22 There is often no direct or indirect
and other building expenses doubles or triples, because the developer understated the expenses in the promotional material.
The swimming pool he thought he had bought along with the house
turns out to belong instead to the developer, who rents it out to the condominium
owners at an exorbitant fee.
The project's owners are locked into a long-term contract with a management company, often one in which the developer has an interest, so they
are not free to select the management and negotiate the rates.
120 CONG.
REC. 17,547 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1974).
20
See text accompanying notes 34-111 infra.
21 Cf. Agreement of Sale, San Francisco East
10, drafted by the firm of Wolf,
Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
22 However, a few states have attempted to remedy this particular abusive practice by requiring escrow accounts for such prepayments. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.25(1)
(Supp. 1974), amended & redesignated, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.67 by Fla. Laws 1974, ch.
74-104, § 13 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974). This control is limited, though,
and the funds may be used by the developer so long as he is willing to clearly disclose
his intentions to the purchaser in 20-point type. Id. § 711.67(3).
Hawaii also provides for the protection of deposit money. The siatute demands
that "[a]ll moneys paid by purchasers prior to issuance of final reports shall be deposited in trust under escrow arrangement .. " HAWAII REV. LAWS § 514-40 (1968).
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prohibition against using the money to defray construction costs
of that particular project or, in fact, of any other of the
developer's projects. Purchasers generally acquire no lien or
other priority against the property, 23 and they may ultimately be
left with nothing but a worthless general claim if the project fails
and the developer becomes bankrupt. With respect to the safety
of his deposits, the purchaser's lack of remedy creates a substantial risk factor in most investments in a condominium under
construction. For this reason New York requires the developer
to include a warning for depositors which reads, "[ilf this offering
is not consummated for any reason you may lose all or part of your
investment. 2 4
Another area of abuse is the so-called "sweetheart lease"
agreement. Here the developer keeps title to the land and leases
it to the condominium owners at exorbitant rates. 2 5 According to
some courts, the developer owes no fiduciary duty to the purchaser to guarantee fairness in the terms of these rental
arrangements.2 6 A related practice is the "sweetheart" recreation
lease, under which the developer conveys the unit in fee but
retains title to certain of the recreational common facilities and
leases them back to the development at inflated values and excessively long tenancies. 27 This developer self-dealing is accomplished prior to the sale of the first unit, when the 'sponsor is in
complete control. During this time, there is no actual or implied
2
But see State Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Dev. Co., 50 Haw. 540, 445 P.2d 109
(1968). Here the Supreme Court of Hawaii concluded "that the overall objectives of
the H.P.R.A. [Horizontal Property Regimes Act] will best be effectuated by recognizing the rights of purchasers under the contracts as superior to those of a subsequent
mortgagee with knowledge of those interests." Id. at 553, 445 P.2d at 119. However, no
change was mandated in the junior position of purchasers with respect to mechanics'
and materialmen's liens. Id. at 560, 445 P.2d at 123.
24 N.Y. Atty. Gen's Condominium Regs. § 19.2(a)(3) (1964), reprinted following
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339d (Consolidated Laws Service Supp. 1974).
21Some states specifically allow a condominium to be constructed on a leasehold.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.04(1) (1969), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.04(1),

Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 2 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-5 (Supp. 1974).
26 Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), aff'd

per curiam, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968); cf. Northridge Cooperative v. 32d Ave. Constr.
Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 514, 141 N.E.2d 802, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
27 A recent New York Times article indicates that such developer abuses are one
of the many about which consumers are complaining. The three basic targets of purchaser
dissatisfaction are "shoddy construction, unfair increases in maintenance fees and
builders who exercise unexpected control over key facilities for long periods of time."
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 5, 6. Florida's Attorney General has recently
claimed that the long term recreation leases that a major condominium development
firm included in two of its largest projects violated state antitrust laws. [2 Current]
BNA Hous. & DEV. REP. 409 (Sept. 9, 1974).
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duty to future purchasers.28 Thus, for29 the most part, developers
may profiteer without legal restraint.
Developers have also been able, under most state statutes, to
enter into lengthy management contracts with the condominium
association, which they control, at inflated rates of compensation.
Here also, the courts have been unwilling to interfere with the
agreements. The courts have consistently failed to imply any
quasi-fiduciary relationship between seller and buyer. 30
Condominium documents are often drafted so that control
effectively remains with the developer for longer periods of time
than the state statutes had envisioned. For example, although

"8 See

Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282

So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1968); cf Northridge Cooperative v. 32d Ave. Constr. Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 514, 141 N.E.2d
802, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1967). But see COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMInIUMS 17 (J. McCord
ed. 1969); Rohan, Cooperative Apartment Transfers: Evaluation of Project Offerings and
Representation of Purchasers, 19 STAN. L. REV. 978, 987-89 (1967).
29 Although the concept of "abusive profits" is not specifically defined in the cases,
the Internal Revenue Service has determined that eight percent of the cost of recreation land and improvements is a "reasonable rate of return" for rental income from
recreation leases. Returns above that rate are considered excessive, and all excesses are
given special tax consequences. See text accompanying notes 87-91 infra.
" In response to the court's unwillingness to cast a developer in the role of a
fiduciary with respect to future purchasers, the Florida legislature originally amended
its condominium statute to provide for cancellation of management or maintenance
contracts "at any time subsequent to the time any individual unit owners assume control of their association by vote of no less than 75 percent of said individual unit owners."
FiL. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.13(4), 711.30 (Supp. 1974-75), repealed, Fla. Laws 1974, ch.
74-104, §§ 8, 14 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974). This provision has been
substantially altered in the new Florida amendments, Fi. STAT. ANN. § 711.66(5), Fla.
Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974). The impact
of this cancellation provision will be examined in more detail. See notes 151-54 infra &
accompanying text. For a discussion of the recent changes in the Florida statute, see
text accompanying notes 155-175 infra.
The recently enacted Virginia Condominium Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to
79.103 (Supp. 1974), has dealt with the problem of extended control more directly.
By implicitly recognizing the lack of clarity in most state statutes with respect to the
vesting of control, the Virginia act specifically allows the condominium documents to
enable the developer to maintain extended control over the owners' association. This
control, however, must cease "after units to which three fourths of the undivided
interests in the common elements appertain have been conveyed." Furthermore,
"[t]he time limit initially set by the condominium instruments shall not exceed five
years in the case of an expandable condominium, three years in the case of a condominium containing any convertible land, or two years in the case of any other condominium." Id. § 55-79.74. These specific limitations have attempted to balance the
conflicting interests of both parties.
The Virginia act also provides that no management contract, recreation lease,
or any other contract or lease which was entered into while the developer haintained
control of the association shall bind the unit owners after the expiration of the period
of control unless specifically renewed or ratified by the unit owners. Id. For more discussion of the Virginia act, see notes 126, 178 infra & accompanying text.
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most state statutes tie voting rights in the association to the percentage interest in common elements, they do not expressly require that these rights vest immediately. 3 ' Many developers will
include a provision in the master plan or by-laws which prevents
exercise of the franchise for a period of five years or until the
last unit is sold.3 2 During this time, the developer may act in his
own self interest.
Finally, developers might refuse to pay their allocable share
of monthly assessments as "owners" of the unsold "units." The
condominium documents will limit the description of a unit to a
narrow, technically defined concept rather than to the broader
definition suggested by the underlying statutes. 33 A "unit," for
example, may not exist for purposes of paying monthly assessments until a certificate of occupancy is issued-an event which
will not occur, according to the documents, until after sale and
settlement.
III.

REGULATORY RESPONSES

A. State
For the most part, the states have not amended their originally inadequate enabling statutes. 4 In those states that have not
yet drafted any additional statutory controls, legislative reluctance to interfere with a freemarket philosophy as well as an
implicit dedication to the common law doctrine35of caveat emptor
appear to be the only justifications for inaction.
A handful of states have begun to impose schemes of industry regulation in response to many of the previously described
abusive practices. New York construes a condominium as a
cooperative interest in realty within the scope of and regulated
31See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.312 (1971). This section requires only
that at any meeting of unit owners, votes be in the same percentage as the percentage
interest the owner maintains in the common elements. These "meetings" of unit owners,
however, will often not occur, according to many associations' by-laws, for a long period of time.
32See text accompanying notes 151-54 infra.
33 Since most state statutes define a unit as a part of the property intended for
individual ownership and use, a unit would exist, in the absence of any provision to
the contrary, as soon as the original property is subdivided and brought under the condominium plan. See text accompanying notes 103-05 infra.

11 See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 4 ("In all but a handful of states,
consumers caught up in the booming condominium market can expect little protection against deception or fraud under the real estate laws.").
" For a discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the inroads made by implied
warranty and related theories in the area of real property transfers, see 6 R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY
938.2-.3, at 370.29-.48 (1971). See also Note, Regulating the Subdivided
Land Market, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1531 (1968).
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by its securities laws. 36 In order to sell a condominium unit in the.
state, a developer must first register an offering statement which
requires a fairly detailed list of facts to be fully and fairly disclosed to any potential purchaser. 37 Although it is clear that
some of the information required under the New York securities
laws can be of value to the purchaser of a condominium unit,
much of the information contained in an offering statement is of
36 The New York Condominium Act specifically provides that "[a]ll units of a
property which shall be submitted to the provisions of this article shall be deemed to
be cooperative interests in realty within the meaning of section three hundred fiftytwo-e of the general business law." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-ee (McKinney Supp.
1974-75). Consequently, the New York Blue Sky laws control the sale of condominiums
existing within its boundaries or offered to one of its citizens. New York therefore will
assert jurisdiction over "securities constituted of participation interests or investments
in real estate . . . when such securities consist primarily of ...

investments in one or

more real estate ventures, including cooperative interests in realty.
... N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 352-e 1.(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
'7 The specific requirements of the New York statute are, in relevant part, a full
disclosure of:
The detailed terms of the transaction; a description of the property, the
nature of the interest, and how title thereto is to be held; the gross and net
income for a reasonable period preceding the offering where applicable and
available; the current gross and net income where applicable and available;
the basis, rate and method of computing depreciation; a description of major
current leases; the essential terms of all mortgages; the names, addresses and
business background of the principals involved, the nature of their fiduciary
relationship and their financial relationship; past, present and future, to the
property offered to the syndicate and to those who are to participate in its
management; the interests and profits of the promoters, offerors, syndicate
organizers, officers, directors, trustees or general partners, direct and indirect,
in the promotion and management of the venture; all restrictions, if any, on
transfer or participants' interests; a statement as to what stock or other security
involved in the transaction, if any, is non-voting; a statement as to what disposition will be- made of the funds received and of the transaction if not consummated, which statement shall represent that all moneys received from the
sale of such securities until actually employed in connection with the consummation of the transaction as therein described, shall be kept in trust and that
in the event insufficient funds are raised through the offering or otherwise
to effectuate the purchase or purchases or other consummation of the contemplated transaction, or that the intended acquisition shall not be completed for
any other reason or reasons, then such moneys, less such amounts actually employed in connection with the consummation of the transaction, shall be fully
returned to the investor; which of the securities offered are unsecured; clearly
distinguish between leasehold and fee ownership, between fact and opinion;
a commitment to submit annual reports to all participants, including an annual
balance sheet and profit and loss statement certified by an independent certified public accountant; clearly distinguish between those portions of promised
distributions which are income and those which are a return of principal or
capital; and such additional information as the attorney general may prescribe
in rules and regulations promulgated under subdivision six hereof as will afford potential investors, purchasers and participants an adequate basis upon
which to found their judgment and shall not omit any material fact or contain
any untrue statement of a material fact.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(l)(b) (McKinney 1968).
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marginal use at best.38 While there are aspects of a condominium
which are security-like, 3 9 the inadequacy of an exclusively full
disclosure approach to condominium regulation has been dem4 °
onstrated by the abuses which have continued under it.
Until 1974, Florida operated a similar full disclosure system
which, while not a part of its Blue Sky laws, borrowed extensively
from that regulatory philosophy. Before the sale or offer of any
unit in the state, the developer was required to provide full
information about certain enumerated subject areas. 4 1 Thus, a
Florida purchaser was armed with a full battery of highly technical papers and documents, and could sue for rescission or damages if he relied, to his disadvantage, upon any "material statement or information that is false or misleading, published by or
under authority from the developer. ' 42 The fact that Florida has
substantially changed its regulatory approach to include many
substantive regulations suggests that state's dissatisfaction with
43
the previous disclosure approach.
Hawaii and Michigan have adopted somewhat different
methods of regulation. In Hawaii, a developer must file a notification of intention to sell, 4 4 complete a questionnaire, 45 and provide for a full inspection of the property by the real estate
commission. 46 The commission will then issue a public report
"which shall contain all material facts reasonably available. ' 47 In
order to use a public report for selling purposes, a developer
must also file a copy of a sample contract for sale and a copy of
an escrow agreement for deposit money. 48 A contract for sale
made under a preliminary report is not enforceable against a
purchaser until he has had a full opportunity to read the final
report of the real estate commission. If the final report differs
in any material respect from the preliminary report, the purchaser has the right to cancel his contract. 49 Hawaii thus differs
38 It may be questionable, for example, how much practical use a potential unit
owner would make of such required disclosures as "the basis, rate and methods of

computing depreciation; . . . a statement as to what stock . . . is non-voting", or "a

commitment to submit annual reports to all participants .... Id.
39
See notes 67-68 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 19-33 supra & accompanying text.
4,FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.24 (Supp. 1974), as amended, § 711.69-.70, Fla. Laws 1974,
ch. 74-104, § 16 (Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).
42 Id. § 711.24(3).
" See notes 155-75 infra & accompanying text.
44HAWAn REV. LAWS § 514-29 (1968).

45
46

47
48
49

1d. § 514-30 (Supp. 1973).
Id. §§ 514-31 to -32 (1968).

1d. § 514-34 (Supp. 1973).
Id. § 514-36 (1968).
Id. § 514-38
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from Florida and New York by requiring, in addition to registration and public availability of development documents, that its
real estate commission issue the report itself. However, there is
no provision that the underlying project be fair and equitable.
The developer must disclose but need not amend. 50 Presumably,
developers can continue to exploit unwary and unsophisticated
purchasers so long as they do not misinform them as to material
facts which are often buried
within a mountain of incomprehen51
sible legal documents.
Michigan too requires submission of relevant documents to
its state commission which, after appropriate inspection and investigation, issues a permit to sell.52 This permit, however, is
merely an assurance that the property conforms to its description. Thus, so long as the proposal is consistent with the master
deed and other papers and "clearly and fairly represents the
property offered for sale and will not tend to work a fraud or

imposition on the purchasers or the public.

. .

,,,53

the commis-

sion appears to have no authority to deny approval. In essence,
this system seems to operate as a disclosure statute.54 There is no
express duty that the developer offer just and equitable terms to
the purchaser, nor is there power to require that preventative
affirmative actions5 be taken on the developer's part before a
5
permit may issue.
50 For a closer examination of the impact and effect of full disclosure, see notes
139-54 infra & accompanying text.
51Full disclosure will be effective in at least warning purchasers of the potential
risks involved only if most condominium investors employ an attorney or other independent advisor experienced in interpreting such documents. This reliance on
independent professional advice is normal in the pure securities field; but it cannot be
assumed to be the rule in the real property area, particularly when low- and middle-income purchasers are involved.
A purchaser may have remedies available in some circumstances even when there
is no statutory protection. Courts in several jurisdictions have been willing to find implied warranties in the sale of new and improved real estate where fraud in failure
to disclose material facts has been shown, Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), or where
negligence in construction is proved, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965).
52 MICH. ComP. LAWs ANN. § 559.24 (Supp. 1974).
53 Id. § 559.26 (1967).
54 Virginia too has recently joined the growing group of states which regulate
under a scheme of full disclosure. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.86-.103 (Supp. 1974).
See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
55However, it is not clear what additional effect may be read into the word "imposition" in § 559.26. Perhaps it could be argued that this requires the Michigan commission to scrutinize the project not only in order to ascertain accuracy of description,
but also to assure fairness and equity. Cf. notes 56-57 infra & accompanying text. It is
not insignificant that the section also seems to give standing to the "public." Accord-
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California, in contrast, uses a permit regulatory system
which allows an administrative body to deny the required permit
to build for specific grounds including inability to deliver good
title, inability to demonstrate adequate financing, failure to show
that the parcels are fit for the use intended, and a showing that
56
the sale would constitute misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud.
An additional and more general criterion applies only to out of
state developments sold or offered for sale within the state-a
permit may57 be denied if the proposed sale is not "fair, just and
equitable.
B. Federal
1. Securities Regulation
Attention on the federal level to condominium consumer
protection issues has shifted over the years from the Federal
Trade Commission and the Post Office Department to the Secuities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve Board,
and to an extent even the Internal Revenue Service. In 1962, the
FTC took jurisdiction over deceptive real estate sales practices
accomplished through instruments of interstate commerce. 58
However, it soon relinquished its limited control to the Post Office Department, which was responsible for regulating mail
fraud. 59 The FTC properly recognized that it was "functionally
unsuited to deal with the problem. ' 60 The Post Office, however,
ing to the language of the statute, the commission must determine if there is an imposition to the public as well as to the actual purchasers.
The Virginia statute, note 54 supra, might also be read to empower the state real
estate commission to assure fairness and equity in condominium offerings. The statute
authorizes the commission to prescribe rules not only for "advertising standards to
assure full and fair disclosure," but also for "operating procedures." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-79.98 (Supl. 1974).
56 C AL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11018 (West Supp. 1974).

57Id. § 10249.2 (1964). See also 42 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 99 (1963). There is no
evident reason why in-state development should not be treated in a similar fashion.
A recommendation to this effect was made by the California Assembly Interim Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy. See id. 102.
11 FTC Release No. 20 (March 25, 1962), 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,115 (1971). See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
" Letter from Paul Rand Dixon, FTC Chairman, to Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, July 26, 1966, in Hearings on S. 2672 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banrzng and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 308 (1966). See generally 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
60 Note, supra note 35, at 1535. The FTC may be about ready to accept jurisdiction again. A recent announcement indicates that the Commission is studying the industry on a nationwide scale with a view toward "'more innovative and numerous'
courses of action" and that it may propose "formal regulations covering the condominium industry." [2 Current] BNA Hous. & DEv. REP. 187 (July 29, 1974).
Although the traditional view that the FTC was not invested with the power of
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could act only when the mails themselves were employed. As one
commentator correctly noted, "a
broader solution than mail
'
fraud regulation [was] necessary. "61
Attention then shifted to the SEC, which, it was hoped,
could provide more effective remedies. 62 The Securities Act of
1933 requires that every sale of a "security" must be registered
under that Act, unless an exemption is available. 63 The term
rulemaking, see, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 964-67 (1965), has been specifically
overruled, National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), the power that does exist allows the FTC merely to
require complete accuracy of description. In the area of consumer protection, the
FTC is only invested with the power to prohibit deception. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
In fact, the substantive regulation approved in Petroleum Refiners only allowed the
Commission to require the posting of octane ratings on gasoline pumps. It was designed
to assure full and fair disclosure of exactly what the consumer was purchasing. Full
disclosure, however, may not be the most appropriate regulatory response to the problems of condominiums. See notes 139-54 infra & accompanying text.
61 Note, supra note 35, at 1537.
62 For recent discussions of the interrelationships between the securities laws and
condominium developments, see, e.g., Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current
Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); Grimes & King, A Look at Condominium Offerings Under
the Federal Securities Laws-For the Idaho Lawyer, 9 IDAHO L. REV. 149 (1973); Hoisington,
Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1963); Rohan,
The Securities Law Inplications of Condominium Marketing Programs Which Feature a Rental
Agency or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1969); Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium
and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. REV.
785 (1974); Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 350 (1973); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 GEo. L.J. 1403
(1974).
63 If it meeti the investment contract test, see text accompanying note 66 infra,
the Securities Act will cover practically any condominium offering. The traditional
statutory exemptions-the small offering, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970); the intrastate offer,
id. § 77c(a)(11); and the private placement, id. § 77d(2)-offer little hope of escape.
As a practical matter the intrastate and private placement exemptions are governed
by SEC regulations. The intrastate exemption requires strict precautionary measures
assuring that no security will be sold or offered to any non-resident. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(0
(1974). With shotgun advertising techniques and the ease of interstate mobility, it
is unlikely that any condominium developer will be able to satisfy the fairly rigid requirements. In addition, there are limitations on resale which would be wholly inconsistent with the concept of traditional home ownership. See id. § 230.147(e). Such
limitations might also prove a powerful disincentive to banks, which run the risk of
violating the Securities Act if they are forced to foreclose.
Rule 146, adopted on June 10, 1974, requires that any offeree in a private placement be provided with sufficient information to evaluate his investment properly.
Furthermore, any offeree must have a high degree of sophistication in order to understand the merits and the risks. Lastly, there are an absolute limitation of 35 purchasers and a very strict resale provision. I CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5718B (1974). See
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1974) (resale of restricted securities). These strict limitations do
not readily lend themselves to the sale of a form of residential housing.
Finally, a developer may avoid registration if the project qualifies under Regulation
A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (1974), although certain disclosure requirements still
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"security" is defined broadly to include "investment contracts'
or "certificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," as well as stocks and bonds.6 4 The leading
65
case on the scope of these terms, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
adopted a definition of "investment contract" which is now
widely accepted:
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests
in the physical assets employed in the
66
enterprise.
Under this definition, it was not difficult for the SEC to conclude
that an offering of resort condominiums together with a rental
arrangement6' 7could constitute an "investment contract" and thus
a "security.
SEC jurisdiction, however, does not extend to the offer and
sale of condominiums used primarily as residences. 68 Since many
condominium projects fall somewhere between the pure residence and the pure resort rental pool investment, .the attempts
to define the SEC's jurisdiction have produced uncertainty and
confusion among developers. Under present SEC criteria,6 9 a
condominium offering is within the agency's jurisdiction only if
apply, and the aggregate selling price of all units must not exceed $500,000, 17 C.F.R
§ 230.254(a)(1)(i) (1974). Thus, a very small project may be exempt.
64 Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). A virtually identical
definition is contained in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1970).
65 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
66Id. at 298-99.

67 The Commission first took this position in 1967 in connection with an offering
involving a mandatory rental pool, and obtained the first registration statement covering such an offering. Hale Kaanapoli Apartment Hotel Development Cor., Registration Statement No. 2-25489 (effective date April 13, 1967).
68 See, e.g., SEC No-action Letter, In re Culverhouse, Tomlinson, Mills, DeCarion &
Anderson, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,612 (Nov. 5, 1973);
SEC No-action Letter, In re Surftides Condominiums, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,686 (Feb. 7, 1972). See also Note, Federal Securities Regulation
of Condominiums: A Purchaser'sPerspective, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403, 1408 (1974).
The SEC recently announced that it would no longer issue no-action letters,
and that all past letters would be limited in application to the particular party and
79,935
facts involved. In re The Innisfree Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(June 19, 1974). This change in policy may portend a more rigorous application of the
securities laws to condominium offerings.
69 Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development,
Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
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it involves an arrangement such as a rental pool, a required

rental agreement, or a rental arrangement sold with emphasis on
the economic benefits to be 70
derived by the purchaser from the
mariagerial efforts of others.
Many commentators have opposed SEC regulation of con-

dominium sales on the grounds of legislative intent, the SEC's
lack of real property expertise, and the unnecessary burdens

imposed on developers. 71 The industry has also failed to comply

voluntarily with the SEC efforts to impose the entire regulatory
structure of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 on these
real estate projects. 72 Developers and promoters offering con-

dominiums with rental or "economic benefit" arrangements are
73
required to register as securities broker-dealers under the Act,
which entails net capital, reporting, and record-keeping rules
and which requires salespersons to pass a largely irrelevant general securities examination.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board maintains that its
regulation T, 74 which regulates the extent to which a brokerdealer may arrange for the extension of credit for the purchase

of securities, is applicable to the sale of condominium "securities." The impact of this regulation can be a severe one: if the
SEC has jurisdiction over the condominium offering, it is unlawful for the developer to arrange a mortgage loan for the
purchase of the unit if the developer-cum-securities brokerdealer participates in the offering. Although the FRB has traditionally exempted the sale of real estate contracts from the
margin requirements applicable to the sale of other forms of
securities, it has recently attempted to promulgate an amendment to the margin requirements reversing this position. 75 Since
a prospective condominium purchaser normally expects to give
70

Id. 1736. The SEC has also specifically exempted offerings of condominiums
which include commercial space that is employed to generate income if:
(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area expenses
and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the project as a whole
and are not established as a primary income source for the individual owners
of a condominium ...

unit.

Id. 1736.
71 See, e.g., Rohan, supra note 62; Rosenbaum, supra note 62; Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FiA. L. REv. 350 (1973). But see Note, supra note 68.
72 By January 1973, only 42 offerings had been registered, despite some estimates
that as many as 700 resort condominium projects which the SEC would consider subject to the Act had been offered. Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1973, at 14, col. 4.
73 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
74 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 et seq. (1974).
75 The proposed amendment reads, in relevant part: "Credit for the purpose
of purchasing or carrying any part of an investment contract security (for example,
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only a relatively small down payment and to finance the balance
through a developer-arranged mortgage,7 6this FRB proposal
would have a drastic impact on the market.
In contrast to the attempts of the SEC to adopt clear limitations on its own jurisdiction, two Second Circuit decisions have
suggested a much broader basis for interpreting condominium
offers as securities. The opinions in Forman v. Community Services,
Inc.7 7 and 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson7 8 contain language
which extends the "investment contract" theory of Howey beyond
its previous interpretation, presumably in the interests of greater
consumer protection under the securities laws for purchasers of
condominiums and cooperative apartments.
In Forman, a group of residents of New York's enormous
low- and middle-income Co-op City development brought suit
against the developer for violations of the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. Their complaint alleged that
monthly carrying charges had been understated and that other
misleading statements and omissions had been contained in an
information bulletin that was part of the sales literature. Because
interests in cooperatives are generally evidenced by shares of
stock, the court easily concluded that the cooperatives were subject to the securities laws. 9 More significantly, the court held
further that the cooperative interests were securities under the
investment contract theory even where no stock certificates were
issued.8 0 To support this holding, the court adopted a three-way
test for whether the purchaser could expect to profit from his
investment. First, the cooperative contemplated that the tenant
shareholders would enjoy income generated by certain commercial establishments within the cooperative community. Second,
...the condominium ownership part of a program to own and rent a unit through
a rental pool or otherwise) shall be deemed to be credit on the entire security." 38
Fed. Reg. 34988 (1973).
76The SEC has pressed for a delay in the effective date of the proposed amendments in order to study the possibility of an exemption. See [2 Current] BNA Hous.
& DEV. REP. 51 (June 17, 1974). The proposed SEC exemption is set forth in proposed
Rule 3a12-5, Release No. 34-10845, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
79,809 (June 7, 1974). The FRB has agreed to delay the effective date of the amendment to January 2, 1975. 39 Fed. Reg. 20960 (1974).
77500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 74-157).
78365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
79"[Ilf a given instrument is a share of stock 'on its face' it is literally within the
ambit of the statute." 500 F.2d at 1252. Defendants had argued that even where the
transfer of stock certificates was involved, the introductory phrase to the definitional
sections of the 1934 Act, "unless the context otherwise requires," 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(1970), compelled an evaluation of the nature of the underlying transaction. 500 F.2d
at 1252.
81 500 F.2d at 1253.
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the court held that because the Internal Revenue Code grants
certain tax benefits"' to cooperative tenants in the form of a
pro-rata pass through of mortgage interest and other deductions, a "profit," in the shape of a reduced tax liability when
compared to traditional apartment residents, was sufficient to
find a security. Lastly, the court concluded that since the
cooperative tenants do not, unlike apartment residents, pay any
additional amount toward the lessor's profit, the cooperative is a
less expensive form of property interest. These monthly savings
were therefore "profits" resulting from their participation in the
cooperative.8 2 The Second Circuit subsequently added a fourth
test for the expectation of profit in 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson: the expectation of capital appreciation upon resale of
the cooperative stock. 83
These four tests go far beyond the SEC's own criteria for
asserting jurisdiction over condominium offerings. 84 Although
condominiums do not issue shares of stock, they share with
cooperatives the possibilities of expected profit from commercial
leases, tax advantages, lower monthly charges than apartments,
and capital appreciation upon resale.8 5 In light of these
similarities, the Second Circuit might find a condominium subject to the securities laws even when the offering does not meet
the SEC's own "rental pool/economic benefit as a result of the
efforts of others" jurisidictional criteria.
This result may be explained on consumer protection
grounds not articulated by the court's opinions. Faced with a
situation in which a developer had improperly taken advantage
of unwary housing consumers, and recognizing that no effective remedies existed under the SEC regulations, the court
81 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 216, allows the tenant to take a deduction for a pro
rata share of the payments made by the cooperative housing association for interest
and real estate taxes under certain enumerated circumstances.
82 A third way in which it might be viewed that profits may be realized is in the
saving of an expense which would otherwise necessarily be incurred. In other
words, where the going rate for rents in a given area is one amount, an investment opportunity offering housing at an amount substantially below that
going rate is an offer of a "profit," for housing is a necessity and any saving on
that necessity is money in one's pocket.
500 F.2d at 1254.
83 365 F. Supp. at 1176.
84 See notes 69-70 supra & accompanying text.
85 The SEC's own advisory committee on real estate has concluded that differences between the condominium and cooperative are illusory with respect to the
securities problems involved:
Cooperative dwelling units should be treated in substantially the same
manner as condominium units inasmuch as the form of ownership . .. represents no substantial difference with relation to the securities laws. In each
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broadened the jurisdictional criteria in order to reach a just
remedy for the plaintiffs before it. This explanation is consistent
with a recognition of the major problem engendered by use of
the securities law to regulate condominium purchases. In the
absence of a rational and effective regulatory scheme in one area
in which abuses occur, a series of ad hoc judicially and administratively imposed controls from unrelated substantive areas has
been applied in an effort to provide remedies and at least some
indirect controls. In the condominium industry this phenomenon has resulted in a patchwork of partial controls which often
appear to exceed the intended scope of the regulatory legislation. The impact on the legitimate developer has become unduly
burdensome, 86 raising the price of housing to the purchaser. At
the same time, the scheme has failed to offer really effective
protection in the context of rental pool and other covered developments, and has offered no protection at all for the purchaser most in need of it-the middle- and low-income purchaser
of a condominium as a primary residence.
2. Regulation Through the Tax Law
The Internal Revenue Service may be another agency which
is "stretching" the law in order to tax and deter developers
whom it perceives to be profiting unduly at the public's expense.
Faced with the apparently unregulated evil of developer selfdealing prior to sales of condominium units, the Service has
recently forced at least some developers to capitalize the future
rental income expected from recreation leases and to treat the
present value of the future income as part of the proceeds from
the sale of the units.8 7 The amount of capitalized rent is detercase, in substance, real property is being transferred through a form of real
property ownership which does not, of itself, create a security ....
. .'. To assume that from the securities laws standpoint, a cooperative
apartment and a condominium unit should be treated as different from each
other is to create a legal fiction.
SEC, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION 89-90 (1972).
86 As a result of the recent cases, many large institutional lenders are now refusing
to grant construction money to developers who have failed to register with the SEC.
87 According to a member of the Florida tax bar, the "IRS in Florida treats most
of the recreation rent as, 'in reality', part of the sale price of the condominium units,
and therefore taxable to the [developer] corporation in a lump immediately, before
the rent is earned or received." Emanuel, Condominium Developers and tle Internal Revenue
Service-The FloridaStory, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 760, 761 (1974).

One unreported case has upheld the Service's position. Fla-Mango, Inc., [19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. PETITIONS 5190 (Feb. 26, 1973) (holding petitioner
received unreported sales income from leasing of recreation facilities).
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mined by subtracting from the actual yearly rental income the
"reasonable rate of return," established at eight per cent of the
cost of the recreational facilities. The difference between the two
figures is treated as the annual excess, with the present value of
88
the right to receive this excess calculated by multiplying by ten.
This amount is then added to the proceeds of sale in order to
determine the taxable gain.
The IRS has taxed the value of long term maintenance contracts in a similar fashion, that is, before receipt of income attributable to actual services rendered. When the developer corporation forms another corporation for the performance of the
management contract, the Service has deemed the transaction a
the contractual
sale and has taxed the capitalized full value of
89
rights as the (fictional) proceeds from the sale.
Although these actions have not yet been fully litigated and
tested in court, 90 they have been criticized on the grounds of
both tax law and policy. 91 Consumer protection motives may be
part of the Service's actions in this area, and the result is still
another layer of industry regulation which may be extending the
88 Emanuel, supra note 87, at 761.
s9 The IRS maintains that § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows
the government "to rework the transaction as though the contracts had been sold for
full value." Id. 763.
90 Only one unreported Tax Court decision is currently indexed in the tax services.
See note 87 supra.
91 Emanuel, supra note 87, at 765-83. A recent revenue ruling by the Service
may have been largely colored by the condominium industry's image. The Service
has determined that a condominium association is not a tax exempt organization under
INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 501(c)(4). Rev. Rul. 74-17, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1974-2,
at 11; cf Rev. Rul. 74-99, id. No. 1974-9, at 11 (homeowner's associations). Since it is
not an exempt entity, there may be some special problems which arise in certain advertising practices. Condominiums are often compared to more traditional homeownership with emphasis on the equality given both forms with regard to the tax laws. However, certain assessments collected by the condominium association in the form of
monthly maintenance charges may be understood as income to the association. For
example, assessments often include a reserve for future repairs and capital improvements. By definition, these collections are not offset by any current expense which
would result in no taxable income. Such excesses may be construed as income to the
non-tax exempt association. The unit owners would, of course, be required to pay their
allocable share of this tax liability, resulting in a double tax to them which would not
exist if they had, for example, merely saved the capital reserve fund to meet contingencies in a traditional home ownership context. See generally Kiasnowiecki, supra
note 13, at 346-48. But see Rev. Rul. 74-563, 1974 INT. Rev. BULL. No. 1974-47, at 6
(special assessment not income if clearly segregated and used to enhance the value of
the individual units); cf. Rev. Rul. 70-604, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 9 (excess assessments not
taxable as income because either returned to stockholder-owners or applied against the
following year's assessment).
Presently, two bills are pending in Congress to reverse the position taken by the
IRS in its 1974 revenue ruling and exempt condominium associations as social welfare organizations. See [2 Current] BNA Hous. & DEv. REP. 23 (June 3, 1974).
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law beyond its originally intended limits in order to deter unrelated abuses.
3.

The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act

The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 92 was enacted

by Congress in 1968 partly in recognition of the practical "inapplicability of securities regulations to the outright sale of real
property. '93 The Act gave jurisdiction over some condominium
sales to the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
the supposed federal expert in the area of property. The Act
was understood by President Johnson to be a means of
"afford[ing] the public greater safeguards against sharp and un' It was directed primarily at abuses surscrupulous practices."94
rounding the advertisement and sale of undeveloped realty to an
ill-informed public. Its fundamental purpose was the protection
of the purchaser of unimproved parcels of land. HUD was given
control over the sale, through interstate commerce, of any "lot"
of land by the registration mechanism established by the Act.
According to HUD, condominium units have always been within
the purview of the Act. 95 Recent regulations promulgated by
HUD have expanded the definition of "lot" under the Act specifically to include condominiums. 96
Although designed to meet the special problems of real
property transactions, the Act is clearly patterned after the regulatory philosophy of the securities laws 9 7 and functions as
another full disclosure scheme. It requires the filing of a statement of record which must contain a laundry list of information
designed to allow the potential investor to evaluate his purchase. 98 To this end, a property report must be received by
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
" Note,.S. 275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 714,
724 (1967).
9 113 CONG. REC. 3529 (1967).

95 38 Fed. Reg. 23866 (1973). See also Exemption Advisory Opinion-Snowmass
American Corp., Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (Sept. 5, 1969).
96 The proposed definition would include, in part, "any portion, piece, division,
unit, or undivided interest in land ....
" 38 Fed. Reg. 11097 (1973). This definition
was adopted in the final regulation issued on December 1, 1973. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(h)
(1974).
'7 Note, supra note 93, at 715.
9815 U.S.C. § 1705 (1970). The statement of record must include:
(1) the name and address of each person having an interest in the lots
in the subdivision to be covered by the statement of record and the extent
of such interest;
(2) a legal description of, and a statement of the total area included in,
the subdivision and a statement of the topography thereof, together with a
map showing the division proposed and the dimensions of the lots to be coy-
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each prospective investor. 99 Although a cause of action accrues

thereunder for false or misleading statements, 10 0 there are no
affirmative requirements that the underlying investment be
fairly structured. The report need only accurately describe the

parcel to be sold. 1

1

Whatever the shortcomings in the substantive regulations, a
more fundamental question is whether condominiums ought to
be included within the Act's scope at all. The original focus of
the Act was the sale of undeveloped land. Since condominiums
ered by the statement of record and their relation to existing streets and roads;
(3) a statement of the condition of the tide to the land comprising the subdivision, including all encumbrances and deed restrictions and covenants
applicable thereto;
(4) a statement of the general terms and conditions, including the range
of selling prices or rents at which it is proposed to dispose of the lots in the
subdivision;
(5) a statement of the present condition of access to the subdivision, the
existence of any unusual conditions relating to noise or safety which affect
the subdivision and are known to the developer, the availability of sewage
disposal facilities and other public utilities (including water, electricity, gas, and
telephone facilities) in the subdivision to nearby municipalities, and the nature
of any improvements to be installed by the developer and his estimated schedule for completion;
(6) in the case of any subdivision or portion thereof against which there
exists a blanket encumbrance, a statement of the consequences for an individual purchaser of a failure, by the person or persons bound, to fulfill obligations under the instrument or instruments creating such encumbrance and
the steps, if any, taken to protect the purchaser in such eventuality;
(7) (A) copy of its articles of incorporation, with all amendments thereto,
if the developer is a corporation; (B) copies of all instruments by which the
trust is created or declared, if the developer is a trust; (C) copies of its articles
of partnership of association and all other papers pertaining to its organization, if the developer is a partnership, unincorporated association, joint stock
company, or any other form of organization; and (D) if the purported holder of
legal tide is a person other than developer, copies of the above documents
for such person;
(8) copies of the deed or instrument establishing tide to the subdivision
in the developer or other person and copies of any instrument creating a lien or
encumbrance upon the title of developer or other person or copies of the opinion or opinions of counsel in respect to the title to the subdivision in the developer or other person or copies of the title insurance policy guaranteeing
such title;
(9) copies of all forms of conveyance to be used in selling or leasing lots
to purchasers;
(10) copies of instruments creating easements or other restrictions;
(11) such certified and uncertified financial statements of the developer
as the Secretary may require; and
(12) such other information and such other documents and certifications
as the Secretary may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate
for the protection of purchasers.
99 Id. § 1703.
10°M. § 1709.
"o'See id. § 1707.
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normally contemplate the sale of improved real estate, the central question is whether a condominium is a "lot"'0 2 for purposes
of the Act.
From a policy point of view, HUD is essentially correct in
asserting jurisdiction over the sale of units in construction. Taken
alone, a unit is an interest in real property much like any other
and should not be permitted to escape the provisions of the Act
merely because of a slight difference in form. 0 3 In this regard, it
is interesting to note that the typical state enabling statute does
not require that a unit be within a completed building. A unit is
generally defined as "a part of the property intended for any
type of use or uses"'10 4 or "a part of the property designed or
intended for any type of independent use."' 0 5 If the condominium form were exempt in its entirety, any land sales offering could avoid the effect of the Act by declaring the subdivision
a condominium, filing the appropriate plans with the state, and
selling the "lots" as "units." To avoid this problem, condominiums should not be given automatic exemption.
Consequently, the issue of the Act's coverage of condominium developments should focus on the specific statutory
exemption of section 1702(a)(3), 0 6 which exempts sales when
the developer is contractually bound to complete the building
within two years of the sale.' 07 Under this exemption, whether a
particular transaction will be subject to the Act depends upon
whether there is a "sale," defined as "[a]ny transaction . . .
whereby a purchaser is obligated to acquire ... a condominium
unit directly or indirectly .... ,108 This broad definition is clearly
intended to provide what protection the Act affords to purchasers who may be forced to take title to empty or only partially
completed "lots." But if a purchaser is not, under the terms of
102 The statutory prohibition is "to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision." Id.
§ 1703(a)(1) (emphasis added).
103 In construing a California statute, the California court of appeal held:
As used in the statute the word "lot" applied to any portion, piece, or division
of land and is not limited to parcels of land laid out into blocks and lots regularly numbered and platted.
Bachenheimer v. Palm Springs Management Corp., 116 Cal. App. 2d 580, 587, 254 P.2d
153, 157 (1953).

104 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(13) (McKinney 1968).
105 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.102(14) (1971).

10615 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3) (1970) provides for an exemption where there is a "contract obligating the seller to erect ... a building thereon within a period of two years."
107The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration has clarified this exemption,
stating that it would exempt a contract that had a provision allowing completion beyond
the two year period if such delays are caused by conditions which would be legally
supportable in the jurisdiction as impossibility of performance for reasons beyond
the control of the developer. 39 Fed. Reg. 7824, 7825 (1974).

1975]

CONDOMINIUM REGULATION: BEYOND DISCLOSURE

the contract for sale, obligated to close in such circumstances,
then it would seem that there has not been a sale as defined and
the Act should not apply.
A sample contract for sale will illustrate. It provides that
"Seller is obligated to erect the Building of which the Premises
are a part within two (2) years from the date [of signing]." The
contract specifically allows the purchaser the right to terminate if
the covenant is not fulfilled, at which time all deposit monies
shall be returned and the contract shall be at an end. 10 9 It would
appear that such an agreement should not fall within the purview of the Act, since the terms of the contract themselves provide a sufficient degree of protection. 1 0
A proper interpretation of the Act would thus lead, in most
instances, to the conclusion that it will not apply to condominium
developments in which there is a binding contract to construct
and deliver within two years, a provision for rescission by the
purchaser on default, and an escrow arrangement for the return
of deposit monies. In the absence of these three essential contractual safeguards, HUD should assert jurisdiction. But where
these safeguards exist, the statute should not apply.
Since two years is usually sufficient building time,"' the
109 Agreement of Sale, supra note 21, 5(c).
110This, however, does not appear to be the present position taken by the OILSR.
In the form of guidelines, 39 Fed. Reg. 7824 (1974), the OILSR has indicated that a
"sale" will exist for purposes of the act unless there is an absolute obligation that the
seller "erect a building or condominium unit within a period of two years." Id. The
only exception is a "reservation" whereby a purchaser merely expresses an interest and
tenders a deposit held in independent escrow. There is no binding obligation and
may be no formal contract for sale. Id. 7825.
In contrast, two years earlier the OILSR had specifically rejected this broad definition of sale:
The only [other] possible meaning ... would be that all sales of residences...
are covered by the Act if, at the time of signing the contract of sale, the lot is
unimproved and if the date for delivery of the completed building is not firmly
fixed within the two year period even though the contract would not require
the purchaser to accept an unimproved lot. This would be an inconsistent result from the wording of the statute ....
Whether it would be desirable to
cover such transactions-where the contract calls for delivery after two years,
of a completed building on a lot as-[sic] a condition precedent to the purchaser becoming obligated to take title-is not in question. . . . [A]s the Act
is written, there is no jurisdiction for coverage.
Exemption Advisory Opinion No. 1710.1(k), at 8-9 (Aug. 20, 1972). This apparent reversal of position may be another example of administrative overreaching. See text
accompanying note 86 supra.
11 The two year limitation may not, however, be sufficient for phase developments, for example, which contemplate completion over longer periods of time. Since
most state statutes define a "unit" to include the proportionate undivided interest in
the appurtenant common elements, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.102(14) (1971),
the act would seem to require that all such common elements also be finished within
two years. See 38 Fed. Reg. 23866 (1974).
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impact of the statutory exemption is to deny the protection of
the Act to most condominium purchasers. When the Act does
apply, the purchaser's only remedy is for failure to disclose material terms fully. Adequate contractual remedies may not have
been included by the developer, leaving the typical condominium purchaser with no effective remedy in many situations. All in all, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
offers little protection to the condominium purchaser.
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Both houses of the Ninety-third Congress considered bills
which attempted to deal directly with the problems of condominium development and sale. Representative Collins of Illinois introduced a bill which purported "[t]o protect purchasers
and prospective purchasers of condominium housing units ...
by providing for the establishment of national minimum
standards[,] ... to encourage the States to establish similar standards, and for other purposes."' 2 The proposal, designated as
the "National Condominium Act," would have created, within
HUD, an Assistant Secretary for Condominiums to coordinate
and implement the basic program.1 13 In essence, the bill would
not allow any "federally assisted condominium loan"' " 4 to be
made to a purchaser unless the developer submits a detailed
statement which is approved by the Secretary." 5 The statement
requires the usual full disclosure material such as names and
addresses of interested persons involved in the development,
legal descriptions of the land and all liens attached thereto, the
estimated operating expenses, and a statement of the terms of all
1 16
management contracts.
However, H.R. 15071 also proposed some direct substantive
regulations specifically proscribing certain of the previously
112
3

1

H.R. 15071, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Preamble (introduced May 29, 1974).

Id. § 4.

'4 "[F]ederally assisted condominium housing loan[s]" include the following:
[A] loan which is made to finance the transfer of condominium ownership to
an individual or family or the purchase, construction, rehabilitation, or conversion of a condominium project by a developer which(A) is made in whole or in part by a lender the deposits or accounts
of which are insured by any agency of the Federal Government, or is
made in whole or in part by a lender which is itself regulated by any
agency of the Federal Government; or ...
(D) is made in whole or in part by any "creditor", as defined in section 103(0 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 ....
Id. § 3(6). Since almost all major sources of significant mortgage money would fall
within this definition, the scope of the act's coverage is quite broad.
5
"1 Id. § 5(a).
6
" Id. § 5(b).
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enumerated developer abuses. For example, the statement requires "satisfactory assurances that all purchasers . . . will be
given a full one-year warranty" on certain specific construction
details.' 17 The bill also guaranteed that the maxiumum period in
which a developer may maintain control of the condominium
association is one year, and that no management contract may
bind the unit owners beyond the period in which the developer
may maintain control." 8 The bill would assist the state and local
governments in implementing similar statutes for the purpose of
centering the administration and enforcement of condominium
regulation in the jurisdictional units best able to supervise the
construction and development." 9 Finally, the bill provided for
criminal sanctions 20 as well 2as
for rescission of the purchase
1
contract in certain situations.'
The advantages of the proposed national act are obvious.
Most importantly, it would have focused the issues in one central
administrative body designed especially to provide comprehensive control. It would also have created national minimum standards which are fairly clear 1 22 and which address most of the
central problems inherent in the condominium form. Although
it was essentially a full disclosure act, the bill offered certain
direct substantive controls as well. In addition, the Collins bill
recognized that responsibility for enforcement of its provisions
cannot reasonably be expected to rest solely in a federal agency.
Any meaningful supervision must come from the state and local
governments which have more direct contact with the developments.
Just weeks after the introduction of the Collins proposal,
Senator Biden of Delaware introduced another bill also designed
"[t]o protect purchasers and prospective purchasers of condominium housing units."'123 However, unlike the Collins bill, S.
3658 was in its entirety a full disclosure statute. Known as the
"Condominium Disclosure Act"'124 the bill was patterned directly
after the federal securities laws and required the usual informa11 The warranty attaches to all "electrical, heating, air-conditioning, and ventilation equipment and [to] the roofing and elevators." Id. § 5(b)(4).
5
" 8Id. § 5(b)(8). For a more complete discussion of the advantages of substantive
regulation, see text accompanying notes 139-84 infra.
I"90 Id. § 6. Federal subsidies would provide some incentive for state activity.
12 Id. § 7.
121 Id. §§ 5(b)(9)(A), (d).
'22 The act, of course, contains a catch-all section compelling the production of
"such other information ... as the Secretary may require in order to assure that purchasers are protected in a manner consistent with the purpose of this Act." Id. § 5(b)(10).
123S. 3658, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess.. Preamble (introduced on June 17, 1974).
124 Id.
I
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tion in its statement of record. 125 The only significant differences between this bill and other full disclosure acts is that in
certain areas of disclosure, the Biden bill would have required
narrative descriptions rather than the reproduction of legal
documents. 1 2 6 In contrast to the House bill, the Biden proposal
did not directly proscribe the most common substantive developer abuses. For example, as long as the terms of a lengthy
and exploitative management contract or recreation lease were
disclosed somewhere in the documents, the developer was free,
under the bill, to reap excessive profits. Furthermore, the Senate
bill did not envision any federal-state cooperation in implement127
ing the terms of the Act.
A third bill was introduced by Senators Proxmire and
Brooke.128 It is clear that the sponsors of S. 4047 understand the
basic problems inherent in the industry.' 2 9 Senator Proxmire,
speaking for himself and Senator Brooke, recognized that condominiums today provide 30an attractive solution to the problems
of lower-income housing.'
In essence, S. 4047 combined most of the elements of the
House bill with some of the securities-like provisions of the
Biden bill. Like the Collins proposal, the Proxmire-Brooke bill
required that the statement of record contain "satisfactory assurances" that the unit owners would receive a one year warranty
on some basic structural components;' 3 1 would be able to form
the association and thereby to divest the developer of extended
control within a maximum period of one year; 32 and would
not be trapped into management contracts which extend beyond
the period in which the owners may be excluded from association control.' 33 All other problem areas would be regulated by
means of a system of full disclosure. Thus as long as material
provisions of long term recreation leases are disclosed, 3 4 there
125 Id. § 6.

126 However, only relatively few disclosures require a narrative description. Copies
of actual contracts and condominium documents are included in the statements. See id.
§§ 6, 8. On the other hand, the new Virginia act requires narrative descriptions to a
greater extent. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.90 (Supp. 1974).
127 This raises the question whether the federal regulatory effort would be adequately
funded, in light of the size of the condominium industry.
128S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced on Sept. 26, 1974).
129 See 120 CONG. REc. 17,547 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1974).

130 Senator Proxmire remarked, "Certainly condominiums do represent an attractive housing choice for many people. They offer homeownership and its accompanying
tax benefits to people whose incomes are too low to afford conventional housing." Id.
131
S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a)(l 1) (1974).
32
1 Id. § 5(a)(12)(A).
3
1 3 Id. § 5(a)(12)(D).
134 Like the Biden bill, S. 4047 envisions a two-tier process. A statement of record
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was nothing in the bill to prevent developer abuses in this area.
Unlike the House bill, the Proxmire-Brooke proposal did
not envision any continuing relationship between the states and
the federal government. The only reference to.state law in the
proposed act was contained in an "inconsistency provision"
which allowed the state to legislate in a manner which affords
"greater protection to the consumer."1 3 5 Exemption provisions
were also available to states which regulate under a "substantially
similar" scheme. 13 6 There was, however, no incentive provided
the states to assume primary responsibility for regulation of the
37
industry.1
Although they suffered from many shortcomings, the national acts would have provided an essential element missing
from the present regulatory scheme-concentration of control in
an agency tailored to deal with the special problems of the condominium industry. Such concentration of control would by itself likely have provided the impetus to reverse the current
trend towards layered and unrelated systems of inadequate
regulation. 3 8 If they accomplished nothing else, the bills would
have relieved the legitimate developer from a series of regulatory controls which have done little more than stretch laws
beyond their intended scope and add further development costs
which are, in turn, passed along to the consumer without a corresponding return in protection. However, it still must be determined whether, the full disclosure approach is appropriate as
the exclusive regulatory response.
V.

DISCLOSURE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

A. The Failure of Disclosure
Thus far it is clear that the existing regulation of the condominium industry is wholly inadequate. At the state level, the
great majority of jurisdictions have failed to improve upon their
original enactments which, for the most part, afford very little
protection. The federal responses, while numerous, have been
must be filed with HUD. Id. § 5. A public offering statement must then be prepared
for distribution to any purchaser. It must contain in full and, in some instances, in
narrative form as well, much of the information contained in the statement of record,
and it "shall disclose fully and accurately . . . the characteristics of the project .
Id. § 7(a).
35

Id. § 13(a).
36
1 Id. § 13(b).
'

Compare id.-with H.R. 15071, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b) (1974).
act should specifically amend the securities, interstate
land sales, and other relevant acts in order to minimize administrative confusion.
138 Any comprehensive
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largely ineffectual, if not entirely inappropriate. The regulation
that does exist is characterized almost uniformly by full disclosure requirements. In view of the prevalance of this approach,
the question which must finally be answered is whether the
disclosure laws address the problems in an effective and practical way.
The philosophy of full disclosure regulation is best exemplified in the securities laws. As one commentator in that field
has observed, "[e]ver since the enactment of the first federal
securities law in 1933, primary regulatory reliance has been
placed on a system of disclosure."'139 Disclosure was envisioned
as a means of balancing the needs of the purchasing public with
the conflicting commitment to minimal governmental interference with the operation of a free market. The philosophy of
disclosure is, perhaps, best explained by Justice Brandeis' conclusion that "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for
social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants .... 140
More recently, the effectiveness of a disclosure system has
been seriously questioned. 141 Some commentators have pointed
to the length and enormous complexity of many prospectuses,
and have recognized that the potential investor is not likely to
understand or properly evaluate a large percentage of the reproduced material.' 42 As prospectuses and other disclosure
documents have become more and more complex, the information made available has grown increasingly meaningless to the
great majority of the investing public. For example, one survey
reveals that from a representative sample of stockholders, "43
percent understood little or nothing from a company's formal
financial statements, more than 50 percent could not define the
meaning of depreciation, and virtually all were confused by the
concept of cash flow."'1 4 3 This suggests that one of the fundamental assumptions of an effective system of regulation by dis139Barack, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1516, 1526 (1974). See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO
INVESTORS-A

REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE

'33

AND

'34 ACTS 10 (1969).
140L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1913).
141See,

e.g., Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45

N.Y.U.L. REV. 1151 (1970); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against PermittingProjections,40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222 (1971);

Barack, supra note 139. See also Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300 (1961).
142 The problem of incomprehensible disclosures has been recognized by the SEC
itself. See Securities Act Release No. 5119, Exchange Act Release No. 9040, [19701971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,939 (Dec. 16, 1970).
143 Barack, supra note 139, at 1527.
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closure is open to question. For the regulatory system to work, a
potential purchaser must be equipped with the basic tools with
which to analyze and evaluate the underlying investment. Even
the most efficient scheme of full disclosure cannot be of any
substantial value to an investor incapable of reacting to informadon in an appropriate and rational manner.
The securities regulators themselves have recognized that
full disclosure is not always an adequate response to all industry
problems. 1 4 4 In recent years, the SEC has taken some affirmative
actions against certain industry practices understood as inherently deceptive or fraudulent. For example, proposed rule
1Ob-12, under section 10 of the 1934 act, would directly prohibit
the distribution of stock dividends by an issuer if earned surplus
would not cover the value of the shares distributed. In prefatory
explanation, the Commission stated:
Pro rata stock distributions to stockholders in amounts
which are relatively small in relation to the number of
shares outstanding are a means of conveying [a false]
impression . . . . Instances have recently come to the
attention of the Commission in which such distributions
were utilized ... creating a misleading impression145concerning the results of operations of the company.
The proposed rule does not relate to any requirement of disclosure. The Commission has apparently taken the position that
no amount of disclosure is sufficient to legitimize a practice
deemed inherently deceptive or abusive.' 46 Thus, under certain
conditions, something more than disclosure is mandated.
In the condominium industry, the objections to the almost
exclusive reliance on full disclosure apply with even greater
force. Investors in the securities markets are generally fairly
144 The Real Estate Advisory Commission, set up by the SEC to examine condominiums, recognized the possible need for substantive regulation. "If. . . improved disclosure and enforcement does not achieve this end, a regulatory approach, perhaps
similar to the Oil and Gas Investment Bill of 1972 may be necessary." SEC, REPORT OF
THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMIS-

4 (1972). Raymond Dickey, the chairman of that Committee, has suggested that
the Investment Co. Act of 1940 might be a model for the SEC in the control of high fees
and other charges paid under rental arrangements tied to offerings of condominiums
units. Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y.L.F.
473, 491 n.79 (1974).
145 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8268, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,537, at 83,141 (Mar. 7, 1968).
146 Further examples of direct, prohibitory regulation by the SEC are evidenced
by rule lOb-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1974) (proscribing "short tendering" in connection with a tender offer), and rule lOb-6, id. § 240.10b-6 (prohibiting certain insider
trading).
SION
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sophisticated, affording some justification for the use of a less
intrusive form of governmental intervention. In the case of condominium purchasers, on the other hand, sophistication may not
be assumed so easily. 1 4 7 Many condominium purchasers do not
have independent expert advice on the merits of a particular
investment because they do not retain experienced attorneys to
advise them. The securities investor, in contrast, will usually have
the services of an independent broker available. 14 8 Since condominiums are increasingly likely to become a less expensive
alternative to the more traditional form of homeownership,
prospective purchasers may include many lower-income individuals for whom a home will be a first and last capital
investment. 14 9 While disclosure may be helpful as a limited part
of a regulatory scheme, 5 0 it is as likely to intimidate as to protect
when it is relied upon exclusively.
For example, the following provision appears in most condominium by-laws or declarations:
The first meeting at which members may vote shall be
held within thirty (30) days after the sale by the Declarant [developer] of the last Unit owned by the Declarant,
or within five (5) years after the date of the filing of the
Declaration, or within thirty (30) days after declared by
5
the Declarant, whichever shall first occur.1 '
Such a provision enables the developer to maintain control of
the project until the last possible moment. With this extended
control, the developer may, through the actions of his board of
directors, determine the common expenses, grant licenses over
the common areas, make any improvements and alterations, and
adopt and amend certain rules and regulations.152 Will simple
description, in legal terms, of this seemingly innocuous maintenance of power really provide adequate protection to a lay
purchaser unfamiliar with the basic legal structure? Similarly,
would Florida's old provision that unit owners could cancel
1417
See text accompanying note 143 supra.
148 The securities laws themselves operate to interpose the securities dealer be-

tween the investor and the issuing company and its investment bankers. See Heller,
supra note 141, at 301-02 n.6.
149 See notes 4, 130 supra & accompanying text.
150It may be argued that the mere fact that a developer is required to expose the
elements of his transaction accurately, on the public record, itself provides a good deal
of discouragement against abusive practices. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
151 By-laws of Meadow Hill Development Corp. art. V, § 4, filed Feb. 11, 1971,
Hartford County, Conn.
152 Id. art. IV, § 2.

19751

CONDOMINIUM REGULATION: BEYOND DISCLOSURE

maintenance contracts provide any real protection where those
owners could not act until they had "assume[d] control of their
association"? 15 3 The developer was able, before the recent legislative changes, to lock those owners into that contract and, apparently, 5into
any other, for as long as the documents
4
provided.
B.

The FloridaResponse

Since full disclosure is of only limited utility to a large percentage of the condominium purchasing public, direct, substantive regulation seems to be the only sensible alternative. Such a
system may be justified, as it has been in the securities field,
as an exercise of the power to enjoin inherently abusive
practices. 15 5 One possible approach is exemplified by the recent
changes made in the Florida Condominium Law. 156 Effective
October 1, 1974, the extensive amendments substantially altered
the prior law. Apparently dissatisfied with the relatively poor
effectiveness of its full disclosure scheme of regulation, the new
law speaks directly, and, for the most part, substantively, to the
major problems of the industry. For example, the new law directly addresses the problem of the maintenance of control by
the developer. 15 7 The developer may maintain control by electing a majority of the board of administration. Such power, however, is limited to a system of amortization. When unit owners
other than the developer own fifteen percent of the total
number of units, those owners are entitled to elect not less than
one-third of the members of the board. After seventy-five percent of the units are sold, the developer igabsolutely limited to
three years of additional majority control. Finally, within three
months of the time in which ninety percent of the units are sold,
the developer must relinquish control.' 58 Although it may be
argued that the time in which the developer may maintain control is too long, at least the Florida legislature has recognized the
153FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.13(4) (Supp. 1974), repealed by Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104,
§ 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974). Section 16 of the new law has added
a section to the Florida Code-§ 711.66(5)-in replacement of the repealed section.
This new provision requires that maintenance contracts be "fair and reasonable," besides being. subject to cancellation by the unit owners after they have assumed control.
154 The recent Virginia Act has addressed this problem directly even though it is,
for the most part, a full disclosure scheme. See note 30 supra. The National Condominium
Act (Collins bill) also attempts to speak to this particular practice. See note 118 supra
& accompanying text.
'55See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
156 Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).
157 See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
,58Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:639

problem and has struck a balance of the competing interests in a
direct manner providing a clear minimum acceptable standard.
Similarly, Florida now provides that all management contracts must be "fair and reasonable."'159 This answers the problem of sweetheart management agreements of excessive length
and inflated rates of compensation.1 60 Furthermore, the new law
avoids the problem of cancellation only after the unit owners
have assumed control.' 6' It now provides that assumption of
control is not a prerequisite to the power of cancellation. 162
Thus, the Florida legislature has imposed certain affirmative
duties on the developer
which the courts refused to impose
63
under the old law.'
In the area of advertising abuses, 1 64 the Florida law now
gives a cause of action to a unit owner for damages arising out
of reliance on any material statement published by the
developer.' 6 5 These materials include not only the prospectus
and other items of disclosure required by the statute but also
"advertising and promotional materials ... brochures and newspaper advertising."'' 66 Although there is no direct prohibition on
the issuance of misleading information, the damage action is a
powerful disincentive. The new law also includes a five-year warranty of fitness and merchantability which attaches to the unit,
common properties, and all improvements, 1 6 7 and specific provisions which require the developer to pay
certain assessments on
68
any units which he owns prior to sale.'
In reference to the sweetheart lease, 69 the Florida law requires that the rental may be adjusted only at intervals of not less
than ten years and further that such adjustments may not be
greater than increases reflected in a nationally recognized price
70
index.1
159

Id.

6See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
161See text accompanying note 153 supra.

162 Once owners aggregate 75% of all units, a vote of 75% of those owners may
cancel the contract notwithstanding the fact that the developer may maintain control
for another three years. Fla. Laws § 711.66(5)(b).
' See note 28 supra.
164 See text accompanying note 19 supra.

'15
Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).
66
1

Id.

167 Id.
168

Id. However, the assessments are limited to those related to capital improvements and would therefore appear not to include normal maintenance charges. In
addition, it is not clear that this provision adequately answers the problem of redefining a unit in order to limit liability for even the capital improvement assessment.
See text accompanying note 33 supra.
6I See notes 26-28 supra & accompanying text.
170 Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).
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The Florida amendments continue to rely in large measure
on extensive and bold-faced disclosure provisions to afford protection in other areas. For example, although deposits collected
prior to closing must be initially held in escrow, the developer
may withdraw such funds for use in actual construction if such
use is disclosed in the contract itself.17 1 The risks of bankruptcy,
72
however, are not subject to a similar disclosure requirement.
Similarly, although the statute limits increases beyond the first
ten years of a recreation lease to the cost of living, there does not
seem to be any prohibition against drafting an inflated initial
rental agreement. The only means of regulation of this practice
are contained in the disclosure provisions17 3 and in the option
granted owners to purchase
the leased property at a price which
74
is subject to arbitration.
The Florida law appears to be a balance of direct substantive
regulation and the more typical disclosure provisions. The
Florida amendments have not, however, gone far enough in the
direction of substantive regulation. Too much reliance is placed
on the efficacy of full disclosure in areas of importance such as
deposit money and initial terms of leaseholds. In attempting
comprehensively to define and control specific abuses, the law
also suffers from the dangers of inflexibility. The proscription of
specific rules in advance risks the possibility that "jurisdiction
would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes
which the fertility of man's invention would contrive."' 7 5 Although rules of conduct are important in allowing developers to
conform their activities to the law, a degree of flexibility in regulation must also be preserved.
C. Substantive Regulation Under A Permit System
An appropriate and effective system of comprehensive regulation which answers these problems most effectively might be a
permit system in which the underlying fairness of a particular
Id.
See text accompanying note 23 supra.
173Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-104, § 16 (Supp. Fla. Session Law Service No. 2, 1974).
174 Id. However, the option to purchase does not adequately answer the problem.
Even if a price is set through arbitration, the arbitrators are specifically directed to
"take into account the capitalization of the current rent." Id. If there is, in fact, no limitation on the power to set inflated initial rentals, the unit owners would then be forced
to pay an exorbitant purchase price based on the capitalized value of that current rent
which, in the absence of self-dealing, would have more accurately reflected a true fair
market value.
'7
Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames, June 30, 1759, in J. PARKES,
171
172
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defining fraud).

508 (1828) (commenting on court-made rules
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development would be determined by an expert administrative
body. This board would be invested with the power to enjoin
specifically enumerated practices found to be against the public
interest after a careful investigation of all of the development's
elements. Such a system might resemble the blending of the
California permit administrative structure and the substantive
criteria contained in the new Florida condominium law. Its basic
objective would be to provide effective protection to those investors who might make unwise purchases when faced with a pile of
forbidding and usually unread documents.
A model regulatory scheme would require, as a condition
precedent to the issuance of a valid construction permit, that a
real estate commission check the accuracy of the information
provided and, more importantly, that the commission possess
the power to deny a permit unless it finds that "the proposed
sale . . . is fair, just and equitable." The specific grounds for

denying a permit should be bottomed in the practices previously
described as abusive. 176 Those grounds should include, as a
minimum, findings by the commission that the developer has
failed 1) to maintain an escrow account for all deposit and subscription money collected, with provisions for the accrual of interest; 2) to enter recreation leases or management contracts
which are not, under duly promulgated standards, excessive in
compensation or duration; 17 7 3) to include specific time limitations for periods in which developers may maintain control of
the association; 4) to advertise in such a manner that the development is not described in a false or misleading fashion; 5) to
disclose accurately the full maintenance charges attributable to
each unit with an explanation of the manner in which any increases may occur; and 6) to provide for the payment of monthly
charges attributable to unsold units held by the developer.
Although some of these practices have been addressed in the
Florida and in various other systems of regulation now existing, 17 8 none has attempted to deal with them all in a com176See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
177 The statute might also cast the developer in the role of a fiduciary with respect to all future owners. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
178 The Virginia Act speaks to these abuses through the medium of full disclosure
although it attempts to answer some of the problems of complexity and length by
demanding narrative descriptions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.90 (Supp. 1974). In addition, some problems are spoken to more directly in specific prohibitory language.
See, e.g., id. §§ 55-79.74 (maintenance of developer control), 55-79.79 (one year warranty
against certain structural defects).
The Condominium Disclosure Act, S. 3658, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), is, by its
very title, a full disclosure scheme. The National Condominium Act, H.R. 15071, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and the Condominium Act of 1974, S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d
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prehensive, direct manner. Finally, the proposed system of regu-

lation must retain a degree of flexibility so that it may respond to
developer practices which have not heretofore been employed,

but which would conflict with the purpose of the legislation-the
protection of the unwary consumer. Beyond this, many of the
could also be incorpopositive features of the disclosure systems
17 9
rated into an active permit system.
In order to achieve a degree of uniformity throughout the
nation and to avoid the problems of multileveled regulation
from fifty or more different sources,'180 it is necessary that Congress provide the guiding hand toward the development of
minimum national standards. Such is the specific promise, if not
the result, of all three pieces of proposed legislation.18 ' However, Congress must also realize that truly effective control is
only possible in a system which recognizes that the appropriate
82
units of administration are the state and local governments.1
Therefore, a cooperative effort is essential. Any national act
ought to provide for a system of financial incentives to a state
which is willing statutorily to establish an agency which will assume the primary responsibility of administering an effective
Sess. (1974), are patterned after the Virginia Act and share its substantive-disclosure
mix. The primary advantage of these provisions is their national focus and their creation of minimum national standards. The majority of other systems presently in existence are, in essence, full disclosure schemes. The only major exception is the California permit system. See notes 56-57 supra & accompanying text.
179 See notes 37, 98 supra. These disclosure requirements could easily be incorporated
in a system which directly prohibits certain practices now only reported.
180 In introducing S. 4047, Senator Proxmire specifically stated the need for federal intervention:
Moreover, it is important to do this at the Federal level. If it is done in a piecemeal and patchwork fashion, then we will end with a maze of differing and
conflicting local standards which will cause more confusion and invite further
abuses. Developers will move from States with strong laws and into States with
weaker laws. A person who moves from one place to another will find that
the protections he enjoyed formerly are no longer available in his new place of
residence.
120 CONG. REc. 17,548 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1974).
1' See text accompanying notes 112, 123 supra. See also S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., Preamble (1974).
282 On the federal level, this permit system could be administered either by a
specially created division of the SEC, by a new agency established specifically for condominium regulation, or by HUD.
Notwithstanding the traditional wisdom that states should possess supremacy in
controlling real property development, state agencies administering condominium laws
are likely to face some formidable problems. Even assuming adequate funding and
personnel, state commissions charged with passing upon permit applications would have
to deal with powerful local real estate organizations without becoming too heavily influenced by developer interests. Cf Note, supra note 35, at 1534. A federal regulatory
agency can be expected to be less receptive to local developer lobbying efforts than its
state counterparts. This advantage, however, could be diminished by the formation

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:639

regulatory scheme. Such a proposal is now contained in H.R.
15071, which envisions a system of federal standards with state
administration of those or stricter standards. 183 Direct federal
regulation would then only be necessary in those few jurisdictions which have failed to act themselves. An appropriate level of
federal subsidy would hopefully make this a rare exception. 1 84
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has outlined the pressing need for effective
and comprehensive regulation of condominium developments
and sales. The current pattern of regulation is entirely unsuited
to protect those condominium purchasers most in need of it
-the low- and middle-income families who increasingly will be
buying condominiums as primary residences due to their cost
advantages compared to conventional housing.
Many states have adopted regulatory schemes which are patterned after the inadequate disclosure approach of the securities
laws. The federal government has no coordinated or centralized
regulatory approach: present controls are administered by a
patchwork of agencies which are not primarily concerned with
condominium regulation. The proposed national legislation
of an effective national condominium developers' lobby, or by the filling of the regulatory commission with representatives of developer interests.
Also, limitations on a state's power to regulate activities beyond its boundaries may
frustrate its efforts to ensure protection for its own residents. A developer selling units
located in a poorly regulated or unregulated state may be able to damage purchasers
in a well regulated state. In order to halt such an out-of-state developer's activities,
the regulating state would have to bring the developer into its courts; but injunctive
remedies are not usually enforced in other states. In addition to this, if violation of
a state's condominium laws are only misdemeanors, enforcement and extradition may
sometimes be neglected. In light of these problems, federal regulation of this area
is warranted.
183 H.R. 15071, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1974), provides:
(a) The Secretary shall take all possible steps to encourage and assist State and
local governments and agencies to establish procedures, standards, and requirements ... similar to and no less stringent than [those] provided by this Act ....
(b) The Secretary is authorized to make such grants to the State and local governments and agencies . . . to help them establish special offices to administer
and enforce the procedures, standards, and requirements . . . and in general
to oversee the development and construction of condominiums ....
184 By way of example, the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(Supp. II, 1972), has created and operates under a very similar system. Congress here
has recognized that "[tihe key to effective protection . . . is to encourage the states to
exercise their full authority" to regulate land use. Id. § 1451(h). In order to accomplish
this goal, annual grants have been made available to provide up to two-thirds of the
funding for local administration, id. § 1454, pursuant to federal minimum standards,
id. § 1455(c). See Land Use Planning Act of 1974, H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.;
cf. [2 Current] BNA Hous. & DEv. REP. No. 4, at A-22 (Oct. 31, 1973).
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would go far to remedy this situation, but none of the proposed
bills would adequately protect the purchasing public.
A more efficient and effective regulatory approach would
be the establishment of a permit-granting administrative commission operating within the statutory context of substantive
proscriptions. The interests of the legitimate developer l 5 as well
as those of the purchasing public would be served by such a
system. In considering regulatory legislation in this area, Congress now has the opportunity to make a significant contribution
to the availability of "decent housing to all our people" on terms
that are fair to them.
18- In the words of one commentator, "the proper control of marginal and fraudulent operators is as great an asset to the legitimate developer as it is to the uninformed
purchaser." Note, supra note 93, at 727.

